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WALKING THE PLANK: HOW UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1816, WHILE PROGRESSIVE, FAILS
TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO SOMALI
PIRACY
Matthew C. Houghton*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.",
On April 4th, 2008 the French sailing yacht Le Ponant left the Seychelles toS2
return back to the Mediterranean. As most of the ship's wealthy passengers had
disembarked at the last port of call, only a skeleton crew manned the Le Ponant
as it navigated the Gulf of Aden.3 The pirates first commandeered a Yemeni
trawler vessel which subsequently served as their base ship before the attack on
the Le Ponant.4 When the Somali pirates noticed the Le Ponant, its peaceful
voyage was suddenly interrupted by bursts of automatic gunfire and swarming5
speedboats. Armed with only a fire hose, the Le Ponant and her crew were
defenseless against the pirates' attack. The pirates quickly commandeered the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, University of Tulsa College of Law. I want to thank my wife, Sarah,
for her support and understanding, as well as my brother and parents for making this opportunity a
reality. The outstanding efforts of the editorial staff of the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law have made this academic effort what it is today.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 88, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. Pirates Raid French Luxury Yacht, SKY NEWS, Apr. 5, 2008,
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/WAorld-News/Somalia-Pirates-Raid-French-Luxury-Yacht-Le-
Ponant/Article/20080411311882?lpos=WorldNewsArticle RelatedContentRegion 1 3&lid=A
RTICLE_1311882_Somalia%3APiratesRaid FrenchLuxuryYacht LePonant.
3. See id.
4. Pirates used 'good conduct guide' in French yacht siege: source, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Apr. 17, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ic41 Mhcdvj6BV5HsRB-uabBjyUmA
(hereinafter CONDUCT GUIDE).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Le Ponant and transferred her crew to the Somali village of Garaad-Ade in the
northern Puntland region of Somalia. 7 There the crew was held captive for over
a week. 8 The hostage crew was eventually released to the French navy after a
two million dollar ransom was paid.9 After the hostages had been released, the
pirates slipped ashore and attempted to escape.' 0  French troops pursued via
helicopter and destroyed the pirates' escape vehicle.'1  The French helicopter
assault resulted in the capture of six alleged pirates and the recovery of what was
presumed to be a portion of the ransom money.12 The story of the Le Ponant
and her crew has a happier ending than most modem tales of piracy. 13  The
demonstrative aspects of this action-packed scenario are twofold: first, it depicts
the violent nature of Somalia's piracy problem, and second, it provides an
example of what a country with access to Somalia's territorial waters can do to
combat the epidemic of piracy. 14 Through Resolution 1816, the United Nations
now grants its Member States the ability to lawfully follow the French example
and pursue the Somali pirates into their previously protected territorial waters. 15
Unfortunately for those utilizing the shipping lanes along Somalia's vast coast,
tactical operations against pirates are still voluntary under Resolution 1816.16
The perpetual increase in global trade has necessitated a directly
proportional increase in transportation of goods across the Earth's vast oceans.17
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Angela Doland, French Troops Attack Pirates after 30 Hostages Freed, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/1 1/AR2008041103537.html.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Compare Doland, supra note 10, with Somali pirates kill ship crew member: maritime
source, REUTERS, June 4, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0413318520070604 (noting that loss of life has
occurred in similar situations in the past).
14. Doland, supra note 10; S.C. Res. 1816, 7, U.N. Doc. S / RES / 1816 (June 2, 2008)
[hereinafter Resolution 1816] (noting that Resolution 1816 grants Member States the ability to
enter Somalia's territorial water).
15. Resolution 1816, supra note 14, 7.
16. Id. (noting that Resolution 1816 allows countries to commit their own forces to combat an
international problem, but refuses to allocate any United Nations peacekeeping forces in either a
naval, or a land based strategy to prevent piracy off of Somalia's coast.).
17. See Shipping volumes to increase 8%, INT'L FREIGHT WK., July 23, 2008,
http://www.internationalfreightweek.com/upl-images/news/Shippingvolumestoincrease823July08
EB.pdf; WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2007, Six decades of multilateral trade
cooperation: What have we learnt, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/anrepe/world-tradereport07_e.pdf
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The international community has long recognized the need to protect this flow of
trade from seafaring pirates. 18 It is for this reason that the recent staggering rise
in piracy has captured a large amount of international attention. 19 The current
operating environment surrounding the fight against piracy on the high seas has
shifted from the eradication of swashbuckling Caribbean opportunists to the
deadly struggle to protect trade routes and relief supplies from the desperate
pirates of a failed state. The traditional media inspired association of piracy
with affable characters should not be inaccurately applied to the modem day
pirates who prey upon the innocent. 2 1  On the west coast of Africa, Somali
pirates target the shipping lanes that feed the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden.
22
These pirates are motivated by hunger and their ruthless tactics are a byproduct
of the perpetual cycles of violence and strife that plague their homeland.
23
Luxury yachts, tug boats, food shipments and oil tanker ships have all fallen
18. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 100; United Nations Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (1992) [hereinafter Rome Convention].
19. ICC Com. Crime Services, Piracy figures up by 20% for first quarter of 2008, Apr. 15,
2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=109; See also Piracy in waters off the coast
of Somalia, Briefing 48, Int'l Mar. Org., Nov. 24, 2005,
http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topicid=1178. (noting the description of drastic
recent increases in Somalia's piracy problem, and the persistent pleas for help from the IMO that,
until Resolution 1816 went largely unanswered) [hereinafter IMO Briefing 48]; Helmut Tuerk,
Combating Terrorism At Sea -The Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Maritime
Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 337, 338-39 (2008) (noting that since 2001,
increasing numbers of nations have ratified the Rome Convention which arguably demonstrates an
increase in international desire to eradicate threats to trade and stability in the forms piracy and
terrorism.)
20. Compare JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND TERROR ON THE
HIGH SEAS, at 9-10, Plume (2003) with Somali pirates find booming business as nations attempt a
crackdown, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/usworld/2008/04/23/2008-04-
23_somali pirates find boomingbusiness as .html [hereinafter Booming Business].
21. Compare BURNETr, supra note 20 at 9-10, with Booming Business, supra note 20.
22. See Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 42 INT'L LAW. 797, 808 (2008)
(noting the attacks off of Somalia's coast on World Food Programme (WFP) aid shipments); Xan
Rice, UN authorises navies to tackle Somali pirates, GUARDIAN NEWS, June 3, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/03/unitednations.somalia (noting the geographic
location of attacks).
23. See Hunger and Terror, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cftn?story_id=12059342&fsrc=rss;
Somalia, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/background/displayBackground.cfin?storyid=12059342 (noting how
the last two decades have been both violent and turbulent for Somalia and its people).
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victim to the violent acts of Somali pirates. 24 In some instances, pirates have
even attacked and commandeered aid shipments bound for their countrymen.
25
Unfortunately most, if not all, Indian Ocean sea traffic en route to, or leaving
from, the Mediterranean Sea must come within reach of the Somali coastline.
26
Globally, pirates typically choose their targets based on regional•27
influences. While pirates near Nairobi focus on the oil trade, their counterparts
in South Africa aim to appropriate and resell the cargo of merchant vessels.
2 8
The Somali pirates do not discriminate in their selection of targets, but their
main goal appears to be the lucrative ransoms that their hostages often bring.
2 9
During the first six months of 2008, over ninety-four individuals had been taken
hostage by Somali pirates. 30 Interestingly, there is evidence that some pirates
operate by a code of conduct when engaging in their hostage-taking pursuits.
3 1
In the police investigation following the recovery of the Le Ponant, police
discovered a manual of conduct which banned mistreatment or sexual abuse of
captives. 32  The fact that the pirates care to keep their captives in the best
condition possible suggests a high level of organization.
33
This comment discusses Resolution 1816, the potential impact this
resolution will have on Somalia's piracy problem and why more resources are
necessary to eliminate piracy in the region. Section II will deal with
foundational information regarding the current plight of the Somali people and
how it has lead to the increase in piracy which is plaguing the international
community. It will also provide an accurate profile of those who engage in
24. Ethan C. Stiles, Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 299, 301-03 (2004).
25. Id.
26. See Associated Press, Foreign military aid key to curbing piracy in Somalia: maritime
body, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/02/asia/AS-GEN-Malaysia-Somalia-Piracy.php
(hereinafter Foreign Aid].
27. Online Recording: Nick Rankin, Pirates Part 2 (Mar. 3, 2008) available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2008/03/080303_pirates-prog2.shtml.
28. Id.
29. See Stiles, supra note 24, at 301-02; Rankin, supra note 27.
30. Miles Costello, Shipping insurance cost soars with piracy surge off Somalia, TIMES
ONLINE, Sep. 11, 2008,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/banking-and-finance/article472737
2.ece.
31. Thierry Leveque, Somali pirates tell French police of "sea militia", REUTERS, Apr. 17,
2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSL 1783854020080417?pageNumber=1 &virtualBra
ndChannel=0.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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piracy. Section III characterizes the consequences of Somali piracy and
demonstrates how its effects are felt in areas such as international trade,
humanitarian aid, and tourism. Section IV of this comment will describe two
modem attempts by the United Nations to deal with piracy on the high seas: the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the United
Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention). Section V will delve into Resolution
1816 and demonstrate both its strengths and its weaknesses; this comprehensive
critique will expose various barriers to the reduction of piracy off Somalia's
coast. Section VI follows up the discussion of Resolution 1816 with an analysis
of the legal ramifications of piracy. Section VII proposes a new course, that if
followed, holds promise for both securing a solution to piracy and empowering
the Somali people. Section VIII concludes by proposing that while Resolution
1816 is arguably the most effective action taken to address Somali piracy, it still
lacks the military commitment, mandatory requirement of action, decreased
bureaucratic communication requirements, and the land based political policy
necessary for viable efficacy. Ultimately, this comment will call for a bolstering
of the off-shore naval approach to the eradication of piracy and a comprehensive
plan to foster a legitimate and lasting governmental authority in Somalia.
II. BACKGROUND
"Somalia is in a primordial existence, a nasty, brutish, and short state of nature. "34
A. Why?
An understanding of the nature and history of Somalia's internal struggles
allows for an analysis of what motivates the country's pirates; once it is
established why people engage in piracy, it is then possible to develop a
comprehensive strategy for resolving the problem. 35 As a result of a 1969 coup,
Somali General Muhammad Siad Barre took control of Somalia. 36 During the
Cold War, Barre played Russia against the United States and eventually sided
with the latter. 37 Unfortunately for the people of Somalia, this unholy alliance
did nothing to improve civilian infrastructure within the country; instead the
union served mainly to provide Somalia's dictator with the weapons and
34. Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 41 (2007).
35. See generally Christian Bedford, Piracy in Somalia: why solutions can't be found at sea,
LOOKOUT NEWSPAPER, Sep. 2, 2008, available at
http://www.lookoutnewspaper.com/archive/20080902/4.shtml.
36. PETER LEHR & HENDRICK LEHMANN, Somalia - Pirates' New Paradise, in VIOLENCE AT
SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1, 8 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007).
37. Id.
2009]
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ammunition needed to sustain his violent regime. 38 Domestic challenges and
infighting between different Somali clans eventually led to the 1991 fall of
Barre's dictatorship. 39 Somalia descended into anarchy and was considered by
most of the developed world to be a failed state. 40  The local warlords who
toppled the regime began a constant conflict amongst themselves. 4 1 The cost of
this infighting can be tallied in the hundreds of thousands of civilian lives lost
and in the nationwide destruction of infrastructure. 42 Multiple attempts have
been made by the international community to stabilize the region and all have
met with failure.43 In 2006, an Islamic extremist element called the Union of
Islamic Courts (UIC) destroyed the promising Somali government and the
country once again settled into desperate desolation. 44 The sixth month period
of the UIC's rule did, however, correspond to relative peace within Somalia. 45
The United States and other western powers accused the UIC of aiding and
harboring terrorists and therefore opposed their rule in Somalia. The most
recent evolution in the downward spiral of Somalia, the 2007 Ethiopian
incursion to remove the Islamic leadership in Somalia, has brought no change to
the chaotic region.47 Human rights violations are rampant in Somalia and the
United States has continually reiterated its warnings about threats to personal
safety posed by the lawlessness.
48
38. Id.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Brief for Keyse G. Jama as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Jama v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 535 U.S. 335 (2004) (No. 03-674), at 13 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae].
41. Id.
42. See generally Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOR. POL'Y
3, 3, 8 (1992); Consolidated Appeal for Somalia 2007, United Nations Consolidated Appeal
Process, Apr. 16, 2007, http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/webpage.asp?Page=1565.
43. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 8- 10; James Swan, United States Policy Somalia, Apr.
21, 2007, available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/83935.htm.
44. See generally TIMELINE-Chaos in Somalia, REUTERS, June 3, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKL0367271320070603?pageNumber= 1 &virtualBrandCh
annel=0.
45. See Bedford, supra note 35.
46. Id.
47. Country Profile: Somalia, BBC NEWS, June 18, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/countryprofiles/1072592.stm. (noting there has been little
improvement in the government, infrastructure or general well being of the Somali people since
the Ethiopian led incursion and also that to the contrary, confirmed incidents of piracy have
skyrocketed.).
48. Swan, supra note 43 (noting both that the United States has significant interests in Somalia,
and the implicit lack of confidence in the current state of governmental affairs in Somalia).
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After the 1991 collapse of Somalia's government, the country was fractured
into several different regions.49  Control of each has depended largely upon
military might.50 Those individuals in power within these separate and distinct
regions required a revenue stream to finance their militias on the ground.
5 1
Piracy and fishing have each contributed to the funding of militia operations in
Somalia. 52 Each of these activities is corrupt in its own way. 53 Piracy is facially
and unequivocally a criminal enterprise and therefore, synonymous with
corruption. 54  The Somali fishing industry has been corrupted by many
developing nations such as Italy, New Zealand, China and South Korea that have
allegedly obtained illegal commercial fishing licenses.5 5 The questionable sale
of these licenses provides further funding for the warlords' ground forces.
56
Many nations continue to fish in Somalia's waters without obtaining a license;
the presence of these illegal fishing vessels is then used to justify the presence of
"Maritime Militias" who work for the warlords under the auspices of ensuring
only properly licensed fishing vessels are allowed to operate off the coast.
5
This civic duty is considered necessary by some in order to protect one of the
few viable industries in Somalia but has in all likelihood been perverted into
what is now the current Somali piracy industry. 58 In sum, the violent history of
Somalia and its people, combined with a near limitless supply of military
49. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 9.
50. See generally The fragmentation of Somalia, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9914899.
51. See generally LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 9-11.
52. Daniel Wallis, Piracy ransoms funding Somalia insurgency, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSLO00572320080824?pageNumber= 1 &virtualBra
ndChannel=0; see also Jeffery Gettleman, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/0Ipirates.html?_r= 1 &hp&oref-slogin (taking
note that fishing in Somalia evolved into piracy, thus corrupting the fishing trade and indirectly
bringing about the funding of the Somali warlords. These same warlords then fund pirate
organizations under the auspices of protecting Somali territorial waters from unauthorized foreign
fishing vessels.).
53. See generally Wallis, supra note 54; Gettleman, supra note 54.
54. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 111; Rome Convention, supra note 18 (noting the
definition of piracy and making clear that it is a criminal act).
55. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 12-13; see generally Bedford, supra note 35.
56. See generally Bedford, supra note 35.
57. Id.; Gettleman, supra note 52; Xan Rice, How savage pirates reign on the world's seas,
THE OBSERVER, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/27/somalia 1.
58. Bedford, supra note 35.
2009] 259
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
hardware and a lack of viable employment opportunities, has created an
environment fraught with the desperation needed for fostering piracy.
59
In order for piracy to be lucrative and have a low potential for capture, there
• , ,, ... .. ,,60
must be an "enabling environment. Throughout history, and currently in parts
of Asia, this environment translates into one which facilitates an easy exit
strategy. In other words, the topography of the land is such that pirates may
conduct their intended acts only to flee and find readily available shelter from
authorities. 6 2 Somalia's long coastline provides little in the way of cover and
concealment, but the lack of any central government authority or any Somali
naval force to patrol its territorial waters, effectively creates the necessary
"enabling environment" which serves as an incubator for the growing problem of
piracy.63 These factors, combined with the legal inability of those nations with
tactical naval assets to travel into Somali territorial waters, has afforded the
pirates the ability to operate with impunity; that is until the passage of
Resolution 1816.64
B. Profiles in Piracy
Somali piracy originally lacked structure and technology, but as piracy's
profitability rose, so too did the organization and arsenal of the pirates.65 It is
believed that after the 1991 fall of Somalia's government, the first acts of piracy
were committed by Somali fisherman who became angry at foreigners illegally
fishing in Somali territorial waters. 66 The Somali fisherman would accost the
foreigners and demand a payment. 67  These attacks, more often than not,
involved knives rather than automatic weapons and occurred very close to the
shore. 68 Presently, the pirates' tactical operations have evolved to the point of
using a large vessel, or "mother-ship," as a base of operations. 69 From this locus
59. See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Report on Human
Rights Practices, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Mar. 11, 2008,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100504.htm.
60. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 11.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Chip Cummins, Piracy Grips Gulf of Aden, WALL ST. J., Sep. 8, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122083029536208391 .html?mod=googlenews-wsj.
66. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 12-13; Rob Crilly, Somalia: Only guns can get aid
past the pirates into the gates of Hell, TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4791081 ece.
67. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 12-13; Crilly, supra note 66.
68. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 16.
69. Booming Business, supra note 20.
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of control, smaller craft are dispersed in search of targets, ostensibly creating
search quadrants with their GPS equipment and coordinating their attack with
satellite telephones. The pirate activities, which were once confined to a few
miles from the shoreline, now range out hundreds of miles bringing the
international trade routes within striking distance. 7 1 Once the pirates' prey is
within range of small arms, they begin indiscriminately firing Kalashnikov
assault rifles, popularly referred to as "AK-47's," and rocket propelled grenades
in the general vicinity of their target vessel. 72 The unarmed merchant vessels
that frequent the shipping lanes near Somalia are the workhorses of the sea and
are not built for speed.73 Therefore, the victims have little choice but to stop and
succumb to the pirates' will. 74  Typically, the pirates will then transfer the
merchant ship's crew to a village within Somalia and subsequently make the
initial contact in what will become lengthy ransom negotiations.
Somali pirates are well armed and, as a byproduct of decades of violence
within their homeland, overly qualified for their violent profession. 76 The profits
from years of piracy are more than adequate to procure the lethal weapon
systems used by the pirates.77  Even if pirate operations in Somalia were
undercapitalized, which they are not, their nation is awash in an "ocean of guns"
because of the last seventeen years of conflict within the country. 78  These
militias have become progressively more organized. 79 A particularly notorious
example of highly dangerous and organized Somali pirates are the centrally
located "Somali Marines," who are equipped with indirect fire artillery pieces
and global positioning system components used to track and isolate their80 . .
targets. The individual pirates who fill the ranks of Somalia's pirate crews are
70. Gillan, supra note 5.
71. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 16.
72. Gillan, supra note 5.
73. BURNETT, supra note 20 at 12.
74. See generally Gillan, supra note 5.
75. LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 3.
76. See Associated Press, Everyone in Somalia's capital has a gun - except the police, INT'L
HAROLD TRIBUNE, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/04/africa/AFGENSomaliaWeapons.php?page= 1
[hereinafter Everyone in Somalia's Capital]; Bahar, supra note 34, at 3 (noting the initial
description of the Pirate's armament).
77. See Kirit Radia & Luis Martinez, U.S. Navy Surrounds Hijacked Ship off Somali Coast,
ABC NEWS, Sep. 29, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational!Story?id=5913014&page=l
(noting that the average ransom as of 2008 was over $500,000).
78. See Everyone in Somalia's Capital, supra note 76.
79. See Matteo Fagotto, Africa's Buccaneers: Piracy thrives in the no man 's land of Somalian
[sic] waters, May 14, 2007, available at
http://www.peacereporter.net/dettaglioarticolo.php?idc=O&idart=7944.
80. Id.
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sometimes trained fighters who honed their skills during the last two decades of
brutal conflict in their nation; other pirates are merely youths working their way
up the ladder of a criminal organization, feeding portions of their ransom money
to those above them.8 1  These organizational evolutions display a degree of
sophistication that pirates lacked in the past.
8 2
In addition to automatic weapons, fast moving boats, and satellite
telephones, Somali pirates also possess the less tangible but equally formidable
• • 83
asset of cavalier attitudes. When asked about the presence of foreign military
within Somalia's territorial waters, a Somali pirate replied, "[w]e are not scared
of the U.S. troops or any other troops stationed off our waters. Why should we
be scared?... They have weapons, but so do we. And we are the ones with the
human shields. ' 84  This opinion, while disturbing to a western audience,
accurately describes an attribute of any peacekeeping force: its hesitancy to
cause collateral damage in the form of innocent lives.
8 5
It has been reported that within the last two years the ranks of Somali
pirates have blossomed from a modest 100, to a force of well over 1,000. 86 In
the Puntland region on the horn of Africa, the town of Eyl has exploded with
• • 87...
wealth derived from piracy. Somali pirates grossed over thirty million U.S.
dollars in ransom money in 2008 alone. Whenever word arrives in Eyl that the
pirates have taken hostages the town springs to life.89 An entire support industry
has developed to facilitate the Somali pirates; there are accountants, negotiators,
and even hospitality workers who care for those taken hostage by the pirates.
9 0
81. Booming Business, supra note 20.
82. See Cummins, supra note 65.
83. Booming Business, supra note 20.
84. Id.
85. See generally United Nations Charter- Preamble,
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war .... to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, ... HAVE
RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.
(noting that the first article of the Charter says that the purpose of the UN is to "maintain
international peace and security" and therefore that the purpose of the United Nations to ensure the
preservation of life and that therefore it is intuitive to expect any United Nations peacekeeping
force to hesitate at taking such life.)
86. Crilly, supra note 66.
87. Marcy Harper, Life in Somalia's Pirate Town, BBC NEWS, Sep. 18, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm. (noting that pirates are now able to construct new
homes, drive expensive vehicles and have even established restaurants to provide food for their
wealthy hostages).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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C. The Obfuscated Line between Piracy and Terrorism
"Terrorism is not just about killing people." 9 1 The subjective intentions of
those who would do violence upon the high seas are largely irrelevant in terms
of assessing whether or not such actions constitute piracy.92  Current
international law defines piracy as, "any illegal acts of violence or detention...
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship .... 93 Arguments have been made as to the proper interpretation of the
term of art "private ends" included in this definition, but the same substantive
result has always been reached. 94 This result dictates that the intent of the party
committing the alleged act of piracy must be analyzed only so far as to ensure
the conduct was not one of mistake or accident.95 This broad definition of piracy
easily encompasses acts which would otherwise be recognized as terrorism.
96
Due to the ever present threat of terrorism at home and abroad for many
western nations, acts of piracy may quickly become synonymous with acts of
terror.97  According to a Somali government official, Osama bin Laden "is
strongly involved in some areas in Somalia" and has multiple possible militant
training bases; the United States also firmly insists that a Somali militia is
harboring those terrorists responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania. 98 The ransoms derived from kidnapping, or the weapons hijacked
at sea, may conceivably end up in the hands of terrorists focused on bringing
harm to the western world.99 It is noteworthy that a group of "pirates" under the
aforementioned definition may be acting not for tangible profit but instead for an
intangible spiritual or political belief that harming a particular nation's citizens
or assets will advance their own interests. 
100
91. SAM BATEMAN, Outlook: The New Threat of Maritime Terrorism, in VIOLENCE AT SEA:
PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 244 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007).
92. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 101; Rome Convention, supra note 18 (noting that
neither definition requires an investigation into the motivations behind the act of piracy, merely
proof that such an act did in fact take place).
93. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 101.
94. Bahar, supra note 34, at 28-33.
95. Id. at 33.
96. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 101.
97. See generally BATEMAN, supra note 91.
98. Bahar, supra note 34, at 28; Associated Press, Internationalflotilla tofight Somali pirates,
MSNBC, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27226220/.
99. See generally Nick Wadhams, The Somali Pirates: Tanks, but no Tanks, TIME, Oct. 9,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1848772,00.html.
100. ROMMEL C. BANLAOI, The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism, in
VIOLENCE AT SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 121,122 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007).
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This overlap between piracy and terrorism could easily be capitalized upon
by the international community. 10 1 A multilateral naval force could be further
justified to an already war-weary world populace as necessary not only for the
protection of trade but also for the prevention of terror. 102 A classification of
international involvement in Somalia as a fight against terrorism would help
capture the attention of many who would otherwise be distracted by the far more
prominent ongoing struggles in Africa. 10 3 Ultimately, care must be taken when
applying the "terrorist" label to Somali piracy operations. 104  In making the
argument that a fight against piracy is a fight against terrorism, one adopts an
approach to combating terrorism that might later be viewed as a misguided
attempt to secure funding and support for a myopic strategy of eliminating
Somali piracy through tactical supremacy. 105  While there are plausible and
probable links between Somali piracy and Somali terrorism, (whether it be land
or maritime based terrorism) there is very little evidence to support any direct
connection between the two. 
106
III. CONSEQUENCES OF PIRACY
A. International Trade and Other Targets of Opportunity
Ninety percent of international trade is carried out over the oceans.107
Within those oceans, approximately 30,000 ships per year travel along trade
routes which put them within striking distance of Somalia's chaotic coastline. 108
Many of these ships are transporting the lifeblood of every industrialized nation
on the planet-oil. 10 9 Somali pirates have become predominately engaged in the
101. See LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 18 (noting that CTF-150's main purpose is
combating terrorism near the horn of Africa, but that his mission could easily be expanded to
encompass the fight against piracy).
102. See id; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command News Release No. 226-07, UPDATE: Crew
of North Korean Pirated Vessel Safe, Oct. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2007/226.html (noting that NATO already has a naval force in
the region and operates to suppress terrorism. Additional or supplemental NATO or UN naval
forces could enable further suppression of terrorism and potentially eradicate Somali piracy)
[hereinafter UPDATE].
103. Bedford, supra note 35.
104. See generally LEHR & LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 16.
105. See generally id.
106. Id.
107. Rankin, supra note 27; International Chamber of Shipping, Overview
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts//worldtrade/index.php?SID=133efdcbc315d26f88826fbb528
dd54d.
108. Crilly, supra note 66.
109. BURNETT, supra note 20, at 10-12.
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kidnapping and ransom business.110  Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that they might take the crew of an oil tanker hostage and set the
vessel adrift without any concern for what is in the ship's cargo holds. 1 I An
event such as this would deal a devastating blow to international trade if an oil
carrying ship had a collision and spilled forth hundreds of thousands of gallons
of oil into the sea. 112 An environmental disaster of this magnitude would likely
close the crucial economic artery of the Suez Canal. 113 An oil spill is a dramatic
example, but the sinking of any large ship in the approach route to the canal
would have the same effect. 114 This type of blockage would strangle crucial
economies in the world that are unable to produce their own oil or any other
good shipped through the affected area.
115
The recent surge in pirate attacks has corresponded to increases in
transportation costs due to merchant vessels having to travel farther out from
Somalia's coast in order to avoid potential pirate attacks. 116 In some instances,
international freight companies have even begun to refuse to travel routes which
bring them within the reach of Somali pirates.117 As the frequency of attacks has
increased, the shipping companies have realized a ten fold increase in the cost of
insurance for vessels traveling near the Gulf of Aden. 118 Another expense that
ship owners and merchants must now account for is the very real possibility of
having to pay exorbitant ransoms for their personnel and property; it appears that
as pirates have become more successful they have adopted a gradually increasing
monetary schedule for ransom demands.
11 9
110. Alexis Masciarelli, Somalia's kidnapping industry, BRIT. BROAD. CORP., May 24, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2005567.stm.
111. BURNETT, supra note 20 at 10- 12.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. International flotilla to fight Somali pirates, supra note 98.
115. BURNETT, supra note 20, at 11.
116. Costello, supra note 30; Sana Afiab Khan, Tackling Piracy in Somali Waters: Rising
attacks impede delivery of humanitarian assistance, UN CHRONICLE ONLINE ED., 2006,
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/073107 somalia.htm; International flotilla to
fight Somali pirates, supra note 98.
117. Mark Watts, Chemical shippers urge action over Somalia piracy, ICIS NEWS, Sep. 19,
2008, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2008/09/19/9157460/chemical-shippers-urge-action-over-
somalia-piracy.html.
118. Crillv, supra note 66 (noting the specific insurance figures that increased within the last
year from $900 to $9,000).
119. Id.
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B. Humanitarian Aid
The last several years have seen a drastic increase in attacks upon
humanitarian aid shipments. 120 So much so that maritime aid transporters have
begun to refuse to travel through Somalia's lawless waters. 12 1 The lack of a
central government and unavailability of basic human services necessitate the
need for extrinsic aid in order for the vast majority of Somalis to survive. 122
This precipitous situation is compounded by several negative environmental and
social factors currently impacting the citizens of Somalia. 123 Malnutrition is on
the rise in the war ravaged nation due to the uncharacteristically dry conditions
which have further devastated the already meager farming industry. In 2007,
the World Food Programme (WFP) director stated that a recent pirate attack,
"underscore[d] the growing problem of piracy off Somalia which, if unresolved,
will sever the main artery of food assistance to the country and to the people who
rely on it for their survival."12 5 In response to this declaration, an armed naval
escort program was initiated by France, Denmark, and the Netherlands for all
food shipments entering Somalia. 126 All recent aid shipments that have managed
to arrive unscathed, did so only through the use of heavily armed naval
escorts. 127 Unfortunately, this escort arrangement expired on June 25th, 2008,
and has left the WFP clamoring for escorts for its food shipments. 12  As the
agreement expired, the WFP announced that two million Somali citizens might
starve if the nations of the world failed to provide adequate naval security for its
shipments into Somalia. 
129
120. See UN News Centre, UN food agency appeals for naval escorts for shipments to Somalia,
Jun. 12, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=26995&Cr-Somali&Crl=piracy
(noting that 80% of the WFP shipments arrive by sea) [hereinafter UNfood agency].
121. BBC News, Pirates halt Somali aid shipments, May 21, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6675117.stm; see also UN food agency, supra note 120.
122. World Food Programme, WFP News Release: More Naval Escorts Needed for WFP Food
Ships to Somalia, June 12, 2008, 122.World Food Programme, WFP News Release: More Naval
Escorts Needed for WFP Food Ships to Somalia, June 12, 2008,
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp 180678.pdf
123. Id.
124. UNfood agency, supra note 120.
125. Pirates Halt Somali Aid Shipments, supra note 121; UN food agency, supra note 120.
126. See Piracy threatens Somali food emergency shipments, AFROL NEWS, June 12, 2008,
http://www.afrol.com/articles/29332.
127. Crilly, supra note 66.
128. Piracy threatens Somalifood emergency shipments, supra note 120.
129. Press Release, World Food Programme, More Naval Escorts Needed for WFP Food Ships
to Somalia, June 12, 2008, available at
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp 1 80678.pdf (noting the
relevant part of the release:
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In addition to the aforementioned cost increases in insurance and
transportation of merchandise, the possibility of millions of human beings
starving because of the violent actions of a relatively small number of pirates, is
moving from mere possibility to actual probability. 3 0 Resolution 1816 does not
directly make provisions for ensuring the continuity of aid shipments.
131
However, if achieved, Resolution 1816's overall goal of suppressing piracy
would effectively pave the way for aid shipments to arrive with ease.132
Assuming arguendo that the international community desires to aid those
Somalis dangerously close to starvation, it would intuitively follow that the same
community should strive to cure the defects in Resolution 1816's noteworthy,
but imperfect attempt to stem the tide of Somali piracy. 133 Another aspect to
piracy with respect to humanitarian aid is that part of the motivation to engage in
piracy may be attributed in part to the desperation brought about by poverty and
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) appealed today to naval
powers to help protect its ships carrying life-saving assistance from pirate
attacks, saying that as many as 2 million Somalis could go hungry without this
essential help.
A Dutch frigate is scheduled to finish escort services for WFP on June 25.
Since the escort system started last November, no WFP ships have been
targeted by pirates, despite an upsurge of piracy in Somali waters-31 attacks
so far this year according to the International Maritime Bureau.
"Without escorts, our whole maritime supply route will be threatened," said
WFP Country, Director Peter Goossens. "Shipping companies are reluctant to
sail unescorted to Somalia, and we have no offers to take over from the Royal
Netherlands Navy."
"Millions of Somalis are suffering from a combination of insecurity, drought
and high food and fuel prices. If relief shipments slow down, we could face a
major catastrophe," said Goossens, adding that WFP is trying to scale up relief
food distributions to avoid a disaster.
Malnutrition is on the rise in Somalia. An unusually harsh dry season and poor
April-June rains, which followed a succession of droughts and poor harvests,
have led to increasing hunger in central Somalia.)
[hereinafter WFP Press Release].
130. See WFP Press Release, supra note 129; UNfood agency, supra note 120.
131. Resolution 1816, supra note 14, at 2-3.
132. See generally WFP Press Release, supra note 129 (drawing the conclusion that because the
WFP requested help to protect humanitarian aid shipments from pirates, such help would be
unnecessary if there was no potential for violent acts of piracy).
133. See generally UN food agency, supra note 120 (showing the international community,
specifically France, Denmark, and the Netherlands have stepped in to assist Somalia in receiving
humanitarian aid shipments); Resolution 1816, supra note 14, at 2-3 (noting that no naval assets
were pledged to fight piracy off of Somalia's coast, to serve as peacekeepers in a land based
attempt to restore governmental function, or to safeguard any incoming aid shipments).
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starvation. 134 In one documented instance, several pirates who were captured
after attempting to hijack a vessel revealed the details of the days leading up to
their attempted attack, "[p]rior to their attack ... they were in an open boat for
fifteen days on the seas, rationing infested rice, and taking turns nibbling away
on the remains of a shark."' 135  Ironically, it may well be the Somali pirates'
hunger which provides the basis for their piracy against the very food shipments
intended to provide them with sustenance.'
36
C. Tourism Industry
The saga of the luxury yacht Le Ponant is a good example of the potential
vacation that awaits tourists attempting a passage from the Indian Ocean to the
Mediterranean Sea. 137 Another incident occurred in early 2008, when a French
couple traveling in a private yacht were hijacked, transferred deep into the
mountains of Somalia, ransomed and later released. 138 Pirates sometimes parlay
the capture of luxury yachts such as these into realistic decoy vessels that are
later used to lure and capture other unsuspecting targets.' 3 9 Cruise ships have• • 140
been the targets of pirates on more than one occasion. The operators of these
luxury liners have even gone so far as to employ sonic weaponry to repel
pirates. 141 While the $30,000 price tag for this piece of equipment is negligible
relative to the value of a cruise ship, it is arguably unfortunate for such a
precaution to even be necessary. 142 Far more reasonable is the expectation that
the international community should act in concert to create laws that remove the
threat of piracy and subsequently enforce those laws without trepidation.143 The
134. See generally UNfood agency, supra note 120 (suggesting that perhaps even pirates are
affected by the trying times in Somalia).
135. Bahar, supra note 34, at 41.
136. Id.
137. See Pierre-Yves Roger, Pirates Swarm onto French luxury yacht off coast of lawless
Somalia, seizing 30 crew members, INT'L HAROLD TRIB, Apr. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/04/O4/news/Somalia-Pirate-Attack.php.
138. Costello, supra note 30.
139. Id.
140. See Adam Blenford, Cruise Lines turn to sonic weapon, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4418748.stm; Roger, supra note 137 (noting that
both ships where luxury cruise ships).
141. Blenford, supra note 140.
142. Compare Blenford, supra note 140, with Associated Press, Royal Carribbean Orders
$1.24B Cruise Ship, CBS NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/O2/O6/ap/business/mainD8FJQAO01 .shtml.
143. See U.N. Charter preamble (noting that the U.N. was formed, in part, to preserve and
promote peace).
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ripple effects of Somalia's piracy epidemic are affecting both the starving poor
and the vacationing wealthy. 1
44
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PIRACY
"Pirata est hostis humani generic" - Pirates are the enemies of all mankind145
It is important to note that the fight against piracy continues long after any
tactical, naval, or military operations have concluded. 14 6  Unfortunately, the
United Nations' first modem attempt to curb piracy, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), lacked any prescription or
mandate for legal proceedings involving pirates captured by Member States.
14 7
After a terrorist attack on a passenger ship named the Achille Lauro, which
resulted in the death of an American citizen, Italy denied the United States'
extradition requests for the terrorists involved. 14  The hijacking of the Achille
Lauro was perpetrated by four Palestinian terrorists with the hope of obtaining
the release of prisoners from Israeli custody. 149  The jurisdictional overlaps
regarding the facts of the Achille Lauro incident helped highlight the need for the
changes brought about by the Rome Convention. 150  The Rome Convention
established a jurisdictional hierarchy that eliminated much of the gray area
discovered in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident. 5 1 In particular, the
Rome Convention comprehensively detailed extradition procedures and
attempted to address any future complications that might arise between its
signatory states.152
A jurisdictional gap exists between such documents as UNCLOS and the
Rome Convention and the practical aspects of pursuing a prosecution against
144. Compare Roger, supra note 137 with UN food agency, supra note 120.
145. Bahar, supra note 34, at 11.
146. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1; see also Rome Convention, supra note 18
(observing that both documents provide a framework for bringing those accused of acts of piracy
to justice).
147. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 100-11.
148. Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st Century, 4 REGENT J.
INT'L. L. 17, 26 (2006).
149. Tuerk, supra note 19, at 338.
150. Dahlvang, supra note 148, at 27-28 (taking note that because an American citizen was
executed during the hijacking the United States had a valid jurisdictional claim to the terrorists/
pirates; conversely, the Italians also had a valid means of exercising jurisdiction because the
Achille Lauro was an Italian flagged vessel. The Rome Conventions attempted to resolve
jurisdictional disputes such as this that arose under the penumbra surrounding UNCLOS's choice
of language, as well as to combat piracy, terrorism, and violence on the high seas.).
151. See generally Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 7-11.
152. Id. at art. 11.
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alleged pirates.153 This divide has formed because both UNCLOS and the Rome
Convention apply between nations that are a party to the treaties, but in theory
have no application to those who are not citizens of a ratifying party.
154
Unfortunately, individuals engaging in acts of piracy, by definition, must be
acting independent from any nation. 155  This issue has historically been• .. 156
addressed by the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Pursuant to this legal
theory, any person who meets the internationally accepted definition of a pirate
may be prosecuted to the fullest extent permitted by any nation, based on that
nation's anti-piracy laws. 157 The fact that the international community has long
held piracy to be a crime committed "against the nations of the world" lends
further support to the extension of jurisdiction pursuant to the doctrine of
... . . .. 158
universal jurisdiction.
The pirates of old began as mercenaries for hire, advancing the wartime
interests of whichever European nation paid their salaries. 159  As the wars
abated, the mercenaries continued the violent lifestyles to which they had
become accustomed. 160  The European nations who had previously supported
these mercenaries turned pirates were forced to develop the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction to efficiently deal with the new threat posed by these pirates to trade
routes with the New World. 
161
Despite the age and origins of universal jurisdiction, it is still applicable to
• 162
modem day pirates. The Restatement 3rd of Foreign Relations Law provides
a framework for international jurisdiction, "[a] state has jurisdiction to define
153. Bahar, supra note 34, at 11-13.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id. (noting:
Under international law, any person who fits the international definition of a
pirate can be prosecuted by any state, based on that state's own anti-piracy laws.
Piracy, in fact, is the oldest offense that invokes this powerful jurisdictional
brand, dating back as far as the sixteenth century. Even before there was such a
thing as "international law" in the modern sense, pirates were considered hostis
humani generi--enemies of all mankind. The English Act of Henry VIII of
1516 extended the jurisdiction of the Crown to pirates. In 1615, British courts
determined "pirata est hostis humani generic." In 1822, a U.S. federal judge
wrote that, "[N]o one can doubt that vessels and property in the possession of
pirates may be lawfully seized on the high seas by any persons, and brought in
for adjudication.)
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404, reporter's note 1 (1987).
159. Bahar, supra note 34, at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Bahar, supra note 34.
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and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of a universal concern, such as piracy ... [and] hijacking .... 163
UNCLOS invokes universal jurisdiction in Article 105 by granting the courts of
Member States the statutory authority to dispense justice to captured pirates. 164
Universal jurisdiction is implicit in the Rome Convention's requirement that
signatory states prosecute the alleged pirates "without delay" and apply
punishment to those adjudicated to be guilty of any listed offense in the same
manner as they would similar offenses of a "grave nature." 165 Many nations
base their anti-piracy statutes on international law such as UNCLOS. 16 6 The
United States for example, prescribes a life imprisonment penalty for any person
found guilty of piracy under international law.
V. MODERN ATTEMPTS TO REPRESS PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The modem version of the United Nation's omnibus regulation of the
oceans, to include piracy, is UNCLOS. 1
68
Any reasonable observer will recognize that the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea is a remarkable achievement. It has established a legal
framework for two-thirds of the Earth's surface; what some have called "a
constitution for the oceans." However, no human act is perfect. Each bears
the marks of its maker and the time of its gestation. Treaties are not immune
from this law and UNCLOS is no exception. 169
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
164. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 105 (noting:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may
decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to
be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of
third parties acting in good faith.).
165. Stiles, supra note 24, at 311.
166. See generally Bahar, supra note 34.
167. 18 U.S.C.1651 (1948).
168. UNCLOS, supra note 1.
169. Martin Murphy, Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States
Combat Piracy?, in VIOLENCE AT SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 155 (Peter Lehr
ed., 2007).
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The path to adoption for UNCLOS took well over a decade. 170 This document
was originally promulgated during 1958 as the Convention on the High Seas, but
was later used to create the larger regulatory work of UNCLOS, the text of
which was completed in 1982 but did not come into force until 1994.171 The
reason for the twelve-year gap is that the treaty required sixty nations to ratify
it.112 The United States was one of the key promoters and drafters of UNCLOS,
but to this day, the Senate has not ratified the document because of political
pressure unrelated to the piracy clauses within UNCLOS. 1
73
UNCLOS defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or detention,
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship" and
addresses the problem in part by mandating that "[a]ll states shall cooperate to
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any
other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."' 174 UNCLOS allows for the
interdiction of piracy on the high seas, within a nation's sovereign territorial
waters and within a further 200 miles out to sea in what is termed that country's
"Exclusive Economic Zone."1
75
A noteworthy aspect to UNCLOS is that it provides law enforcement or
military units the option to engage in "hot pursuit" of suspected pirates.
176
UNCLOS specifies that hot pursuit should only be engaged in by warships or
other clearly identified governmental craft and only in situations where the
170. See Jason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical Analysis of the
Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Authority, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 27, 29 (2005) (discussing the history of UNCLOS).
171. Stiles, supra note 24, at 307-08.
172. Nelson, supra note 170, at 32.
173. Id. (noting that only the clauses pertaining to seabed mining were offensive to the Reagan
administration and were all that initially prevented the signing of the document. All that remains
for the convention to become binding on the United States is ratification by the Senate.).
174. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 100-01 (defining piracy as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).
175. Id. at art. 2-4, 55.
176. Id. at art. 111.
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Member State reasonably believes the suspect vessel has broken the country's
law; additionally, a Member State must give a discernable signal for the
suspected pirate vessel to stop before engaging in hot pursuit. 177 This right of
hot pursuit extends only to a Member State's territorial boundaries up to and
including the furthest point in that nation's exclusive economic zone.178
UNCLOS allows for Member States to continue their pursuit outside of their
own territorial waters so long as the pursuit remains uninterrupted and there is no
passage into the sovereign territorial waters of the suspect ship's flag state or a
third party state. 179 This limitation on pursuit demonstrates the Achilles' heel of
the relevant anti-piracy sections of UNCLOS in that they do not permit incursion
. . .. • •180
or pursuit of pirates into another nation's territorial waters. Somali pirates
have, until recently, capitalized on this jurisdictional handicap. 181
Unfortunately, the provisions of UNCLOS that are pertinent to piracy limit their
scope to the high seas.
B. Rome Convention
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, or more commonly the Rome Convention, was
adopted midway through the ratification process of UNCLOS. 182  This
groundbreaking conference was again the product of the United Nations,
although this time it acted through the International Maritime Organization.
183
The Rome Convention was adopted in 1988 and entered into force during March
of 1992.184 This convention was wholl ' targeted at increasing maritime safety
and reducing violence on the high seas.
The catalyst which brought about the demand for the Rome Convention
was the then isolated incident of terrorism, and arguably piracy, involving the
Achille Lauro.186 This incident opened the eyes of the international community
because it was "one of the first genuine acts of maritime terrorism recorded in
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 111.
181. See Xan Rice, How savage pirates reign on the world's high seas, GUARDIAN NEWS, Apr.
27, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/27/somalial.
182. Becker, supra note 22, at 808.
183. Tuerk, supra note 19, at 339; Stanley B. Weeks, Maritime Cooperation in Asia Pacific
Region, BNET Bus. NETWORK, March 2000,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa5367/is_200003/ain21453717/pg_2 (noting that both
articles identify the International Maritime Bureau as the authoring body of the Rome Convention).
184. Rome Convention, supra note 18.
185. Stiles, supra note 24, at 310.
186. Tuerk, supra note 19, at 338-39.
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modem history."' 187 The hijacking of the Achille Lauro highlighted flaws in the
existing UNCLOS regulations regarding piracy, which in turn prompted the
occurrence of the Rome Convention.188 The pertinent articles within UNCLOS
failed to address single ship incidents such as the Achille Lauro, in which the
violent act perpetrated did not involve another vessel. 189 In other words, the
UNCLOS definition of piracy only encompassed acts committed "by the crew or
the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft." This lanuage essentially
requires the use of a private vessel to commit a covered act. 19The UNCLOS
provisions also required the covered act of piracy be for "private ends." 191 The
ambiguity of this language surfaced after the Achille Lauro incident because the
PLO terrorists arguably were not acting for private ends, but rather public or
political goals. In order to address these concerns, the 1988 Rome
Convention expanded the definition of piracy to encompass hijackings
irrespective of the number of vessels involved and removed mention of a
requirement that the covered acts be for private ends. 
193
Many critics claim that the Rome Convention deals solely with terrorism;
this is a flawed argument and, in fact, the term "terrorism" does not appear in the
document.' 94  The main motivation behind the document was definitely the
prevention of maritime terrorism, but its provisions are directly applicable to
most violent acts of piracy which occur today. 195 The Rome Convention defines
piracy to include any acts or attempted acts of violence committed against a
person or ship, seizing control, damaging, or destroying a ship.196 The relevant
sections of the Rome Convention also attach criminal liability for aiding and
abetting the aforementioned actions. 197 The jurisdictional boundaries included
in the Rome Convention are similar, but distinct from their respective
counterparts in the UNCLOS. 19  Pursuant to the boundaries, signatory states to
the Rome Convention are not allowed to seize a pirate's ship unless they first
have a specific connection with the vessel. 199  This requirement departs
187. Id. at 339.
188. Id.
189. Dahlvang, supra note 148, at 27.
190. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 101(a).
191. Id. at art. 101.
192. Dahlvang, supra note 148, at 27.
193. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 3 (noting the lack of language requiring that the
criminal act be perpetrated to further "private ends.")
194. Murphy, supra note 169, at 164.
195. See generally Murphy, supra note 169.
196. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.; Stiles, supra note 24, at 312.
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significantly from similar operative language in UNCLOS, which allows any
Member State to board a vessel suspected of piracy, so long as that vessel is in
either international waters or the territorial waters of the Member State.
200
Another difference between the Rome Convention and UNCLOS is that the
latter restricted its discussion of piracy to the high seas, whereas the former
increases the depth of its discussion of piracy to include the territorial waters of
Member States. 201 The high seas are not explicitly defined by UNCLOS, but are
implicitly recognized as being "all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State ... ,202 The Rome Convention applies to all ships which travel outside of
their nation's territorial waters and more importantly to acts which occur within
their nation's territorial waters. 203  Notwithstanding this difference, in both
documents the United Nations limited its member nations' ability to respond to
pirate attacks by preventing foreign incursions into the sovereign waters of
another nation and thereby effectively crippling any opportunity to wage a fight
against piracy.
2 04
VI. RESOLUTION 1816: PROGRESS AS PROMISED
The United Nations' anti-piracy regulation's frustratingly slow pace of
advancement has made a large leap forward with Resolution 1816. 205  This
action by the United Nations Security Council was drafted and initiated by a
concert of nations including the United States, France and Panama. 206  This
progressive document is the first to afford law enforcement and military units the
200. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 111; see Stiles, supra note 24, at 311.
201. See Stiles, supra note 24, at 309-12.
202. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 86.
203. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 4.
204. See Stiles, supra note 24, at 312 (noting the following description of the limiting factors
involved in the Rome Convention:
The Rome Convention, however, limits the power to deal with its enumerated
offenses in two substantial respects. First, Rome Convention states have no
right to stop and inspect ships if they suspect a ship of engaging in pirate
activities in territorial waters or terrorist activities. Second, unlike the
traditional right of any state to seize a pirate ship on the high seas, a Rome
Convention state must have some direct connection to the offense to seize a ship
in territorial waters.
205. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 1, and Rome Convention, supra note 18, with Resolution
1816, supra note 14 (noting the long time frame between submission and adoption of documents,
and the deficiencies previously discussed in this comment regarding UNCLOS and the Rome
Convention).
206. Navies to tackle Somali Pirates, BRIT. BROAD. CORP., Jun. 2, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7432612.stm.
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ability to enter into Somalia's territorial seas to interdict the pirates in what was
previously their safe haven.
20 7
The events which led to the adoption of this document can be definitively
traced to a 2005 adoption by the International Maritime Organization Resolution
A.979(24). 2° 8 After the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted this
earlier resolution, it was submitted to the United Nations Secretary General "for
consideration and any further action he may deem appropriate." 20 9 The United
Nations responded in a positive manner by encouraging Member States to take a
more vigilant and proactive approach to piracy near Somalia. 21  In 2007, the
IMO made a statement which communicated that deliveries of aid and relief
supplies were being prevented by piracy along Somalia's coast.2 11 Later that
year the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1772, which took
notice of IMO's statements regarding relief supplies. 2 12  The final predicate
action, which spurred the creation and eventual adoption of Resolution 1816,
was the passage of IMO Resolution A.1002(25). 2 13 Among other things, this
resolution called for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government to consent to
foreign military actions within its territorial waters. 214
Resolution 1816 provides that any state cooperating with the interim Somali
government, "may... [e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of
repressing acts of piracy ... at sea."215 A director of the International Chamber
of Shipping recently commented that, "[t]he text [of Resolution 1816] needs to
207. See id.
208. IMO welcomes Security Council moves on Somali piracy, Briefing 24, Int'l Mar. Org., June
3, 2008, http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic-id=1709&doc-id=9212 [hereinafter
IMO Briefing 24].
209. IMO Briefing 48, supra note 19.
210. Id. (noting the exact language of the United Nations response is as follows:
The Security Council takes note of Resolution A.979(24) adopted on 23
November 2005 at the twenty-fourth session of the International Maritime
Organization biennial Assembly, concerning the increasing incidents of piracy
and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia. The
Council encourages Member States whose naval vessels and military aircraft
operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to
be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to
protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid,
against any such act., in line with relevant international law.... The Council
further urges cooperation among all States, particularly regional states, and
active prosecution of piracy offenses.)
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. IMO Briefing 24, supra note 208.
214. Id.
215. Resolution 1816, supra note 14, at art 7.
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be more certain about what is and is not appropriate activity to suppress
piracy.' ' 2 16 Certain perceived deficiencies lend support to the conclusion that
modifications of the resolution are necessary: a lack of any United Nations naval
assets committed to the problem, Resolution 1816's lack of mandatory duty to
take action (as opposed to discretionary authority), no initiative to protect
humanitarian aid bound for Somalia, no grant of authority by which mariners
could arm themselves for self defense purposes, and a requirement that nations
acting against piracy pursuant to Resolution 1816 must satisfy mandatory
communication requirements with a nearly non-existent government.
2 17
Through Resolution 1816, the United Nations has urged its Member States
to fix Somalia's Piracy problem but deployed no naval peacekeeping assets to
support the cause. An application of force by a multilateral organization such
as the United Nations would serve to deter acts of piracy and prevent possible
unintended consequences of individual naval powers, such as the United States,
acting unilaterally. 2 19 Western nations must be cautious in the level of unilateral
military force they apply to the Somali piracy problem. 22  For example, a
misapplication of force by the United States in a predominantly Muslim region
will again paint America as an aggressor and serve only to further stress
international relations, thereby preventing a multinational naval force from
taking shape. 22 1 This same line of reasoning serves to support the hypothesis
that increased anti-American sentiment, caused by an increased United States'
naval presence, will stoke the fires of terrorism and thereby increase acts of
piracy. 22
Another potential problem with Resolution 1816 is that its operative
language plainly grants discretionary authority through its usage of the word
''may. 2 Nations "may" act in response to piracy, but nations have no duty or
216. Neville Smith, Calls to beef up UN resolution on anti-piracy, LLOYD'S LIST, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.Iloydslist.com/ll/news/calls-to-beef-up-un-resolution-on-anti-
piracy/20017576516.htm;jsessionid=925CB4826C7E32E 1EA87E46CF8E00829?src=ticker.
217. Resolution 1816, supra note 14 (noting that no naval assets were pledge to fight piracy in
Somalia).
218. Id.
219. Crilly, supra note 66 (noting that armed escorts have in fact deterred acts of piracy and
allowed the delivery of much needed aid and supplies to the impoverished and starving people of
Somalia); Bahar, supra note 34, at 6.
220. Bahar, supra note 34, at 6-7.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id.
223. Id. (noting that Member States may enter, or conversely, may not. This discretionary action
clause is self defeating in the sense that most nations that have the assets to fight piracy are
actively engaged in conflicts around the world and probably won't elect to engage in a naval battle
with Somali pirates).
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obligation to act in response to piracy under this resolution.2 24  A more
aggressive approach to piracy near Somalia's coast would be to require the
pursuit and interdiction of any suspected or confirmed pirates. 22 5 Resolution
1816 comes heralded by the media as a panacea to the plague of piracy, but it is
fundamentally only removing the trivial punishment that a Member State might
have received if it had entered Somalia's sovereign waters to rescue innocent
lives and recover stolen property.226 Both the United States and France have
taken action against Somali pirates prior to the passage of Resolution 1816 and
neither received any reprimand from the United Nations.
227
Resolution 1816 requires that any Member State acting pursuant to the
resolution must be cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
of Somalia.22 8  Furthermore, the TFG must provide the United Nations'
Secretary-General with advance notification of its grant of permission to any
Member State attempting to act under Resolution 1816. 2 29 Facially, this presents
no obstacle to tactical response under the resolution, but when analyzing the
actual power and current governmental capabilities of Somalia's TFG, it
becomes readily apparent that meeting these two requirements might be more
challenging than first expected. 23  The United States has an interest in
promoting peace and stability in the region, yet because Somalia lacks a
government with which to engage and interact with, no diplomatic relationship
exists between the TFG and the United States.2 3 1  The TFG has failed to
establish and provide for its citizens' most basic needs.2 32  Additionally, the
International Maritime Organization recently supported a precursor to Resolution
1816, IMO Resolution A.1002(25), by citing a report by a United Nations'
monitoring group confirming that the root cause of piracy in Somalia was the
"lack of lawful administration and the inability of the authorities to take
224. Id.
225. Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Steps Up Anti-Piracy Actions, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2007, at
A33 (noting the efficacy of such measures and therefore concluding that if they were required the
frequency of their implementation would increase, thereby resulting in decreased instances of
piracy and increased confidence in the perpetuity of international trade).
226. See Roger, supra note 137 (noting the French rescue mission occurred prior to the adoption
of Resolution); Tyson, supra note 225 (noting the US entry into Somalia's waters occurred prior to
the passage of Resolution 1816); Foreign Aid, supra note 26.
227. Doland, supra note 9; Resolution 1816, supra note 14.
228. Resolution 1816, supra note 14.
229. Id.
230. Compare Resolution 1816, supra note 14, with Brief Amici Curiae supra note 40, at 12-13
(noting the lack of cognizable traditional governmental function assumed by Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government).
231. See Brief Amici Curiae supra note 40, at 12-13; Swan, supra note 43.
232. Swan, supra note 43.
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affirmative action against the perpetrators .... ,,233 Thus far, the United Nations
has been unable to successfully implement its arms embargo or even admonish
the current Somali government because it lacks any viable government authority
with which to address its concerns. 234  If the United Nations has difficulty
communicating with the Somali government, it intuitively follows that those
same communicative barriers will prohibit Member States who do voluntarily
desire to take the fight against Somali pirates into their territorial waters to meet
the requirements of Resolution 1816.
In addition to Resolution 1816's communicative requirements, it sacrifices
the sovereignty of Somalia's territorial waters in an effort to suppress piracy.
236
The current Somali leadership gladly made this concession and appealed for yet
more help in eradicating piracy along its coast. 237 Task Force 150 ("CTF-150")
is a multinational naval force committed to the suppression of both piracy on the
high seas and acts of terror. 238 This military unit has been in place for several
years, but it has been largely unable to make a permanent impact on piracy levels
off of Somalia's coast. 239 This is due in part to the task force's other anti-terror
obligations in the Middle East, but its greatest obstacle has been the inability to
.... 240
enter the sovereign waters of another nation in pursuit of suspected pirates.
Resolution 1816 will now allow specialized naval forces such as CTF-150 to
pursue and apprehend suspected pirates, as well as to aid those who have been
taken hostage to fuel the lucrative Somali ransom market.
241
The recent increases in piracy are attributable to many factors, but one is
undoubtedly the inability of merchant vessels to adequately provide for their
own defense.24 2 It is not practical to expect merchant crewmen using only water
hoses to repel upwards of thirty or more pirates armed with automatic243
weapons. It is likewise unreasonable to expect the crewmen to engage pirates
without the benefit of modern armament; to encourage this form of fighting
233. I.M.O. Res A.1002(25), 14, U.N. Doc. A25/RES/47/1 (Nov. 29, 2007).
234. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 40, at 12-23.
235. Id.
236. Resolution 1816, supra note 14 (noting that the ability to enter the waters previously used
as a safe haven will allow both pursuit and apprehension of suspected pirates).
237. Booming Business, supra note 20.
238. LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 18; UPDATE, supra note 102.
239. See LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 18-19; Bedford, supra note 35.
240. LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 18; Bedford, supra note 35; Resolution 1816, supra
note 14.
241. Resolution 1816, supra note 14.
242. Stiles, supra note 24, at 313.
243. Id.; En garde 6 vue, les pirates du Ponant racontent leur fortune de mer, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Apr. 17, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g6EiZOLfgWU4_g8uXlZlpG-
zOsOA.
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would result in nothing more than their deaths.244 Equally unreasonable is the
proposition that those who traverse the shipping lanes off of Somalia's coast
should categorically surrender their ships and cargo to attacking pirates. 245 A
constructive addition to Resolution 1816 which addresses this issue would grant
mariners on confirmed courses through the Gulf of Aden the ability to travel
246armed, in order to prevent or discourage being boarded by pirates. This
proposition is not without its entanglements. 24  The United Nations has an
interest in preventing the flow of weapons into Somalia and other regions of
Africa.248 Granting all vessels traveling near Somalia access to its sovereign
territorial waters, as well as the ability to carry sizeable arsenals, could run
contrary to the United Nations' peacekeeping goals.24 9 It may be possible to
reconcile both the United Nations' previous commitment to an arms embargo on
Somalia and the desire to allow shipping vessels to engage in self-defense.
250
The United Nations could modify Resolution 1816 to allow the use of weapons
in self defense and also provide for its arms embargo by requiring vessels to
carry weapon inventories. 25 1 Upon entering and leaving Somali waters, these
inventories could be compared by United Nations inspectors to verify that they
have remained unchanged.
252
Resolution 1816 should not be viewed as a failure, but rather as a
progressive step towards the solution of a problem posed to mariners, Somali
citizens and the international community. This document departed from
precedent by granting permission, notwithstanding controlled circumstances, to
violate that sanctity which every nation attaches to its own territory. 2 54 Such a
deviation from convention came only after the fervent calls for help from
Somalia itself, the IMO and the exponentially increasing population of people
who have fallen victim to piracy near Somalia's coast. The United Nations
should not cite current events or a timely statistical decline in Somali piracy as a
reason to stop the necessary progression of the strategy they initiated with the
244. Stiles, supra note 24, at 313.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 314-16.
247. Id.
248. Resolution 1816, supra note 14.
249. id.; Stiles, supra note 24, at 313.
250. See Stiles, supra note 24, at 315 (applying the proposed general courses of action to the
particular situation involving Somalia).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 315-16.
253. See Navies to tackle Somali Pirates, supra note 206.
254. See Resolution 1816, supra note 14.
255. Booming Business, supra note 20.
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passage of Resolution 1816. 256 Forward progress and successful eradication of
Somali piracy may be assured by enacting modifications to the actual resolution
as well as the implementation of a land based strategy that will maintain the
advances made by the "off-shore" approach of Resolution 1816.257
VII. CHARTING A NEW COURSE
Resolution 1816 is a strong response to the worsening problem of piracy
along Somalia's lengthy coast. Through this resolution, the international
community has embarked upon a constructive "off-shore" course of action with
regard to piracy near Somalia; this strategy aims to resolve the problem by
attacking it from the sea, as opposed to a land based policy to stop piracy. 259 In
order to ensure the future efficacy of this resolution and its progeny,
modifications to its language and provisions are necessary. First, changes must
be made to the current resolution to allow peaceful merchants to defend
themselves. 26  Secondly, the United Nations should require, rather than merely
permit, able and available naval assets of Member States to take action to
interdict observed pirate activity. 26 1  Lastly, the United Nations should
accompany any subsequent resolutions with a commitment of some amount their
land and naval peacekeeping forces to the region. 262  The current form of
Resolution 1816 places a heavy burden on western nations because they are the
most likely to have the naval resources to devote to Somalia in order to fight
piracy.263  An updated resolution deploying multilateral international
peacekeeping forces would see far less political resistance and backlash than yet
another anti-terror fight by the United States and its western allies against a
perceptually weaker Islamic state.
264
If the international community desires complete eradication of piracy rather
than mere repression or partial cessation, it must first implement a revised "off-
shore" approach through the aforementioned changes to Resolution 1816 and
256. See generally Doland, supra note 9 (noting the success able bodied nations are able to
achieve with access to Somali territorial waters. Furthermore, if interdictions such as these
continue to unfold against Somali pirates, it is conceivable that the in the short term the piracy
epidemic may face statistical decline).
257. Bedford, supra note 35.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Stiles, supra note 24; Bahar, supra note 34.
261. See Stiles, supra note 24; Tyson, supra note 232; Bahar, supra note 34, at 11-18.
262. See generally Stiles, supra note 24; Tyson, supra note 232; Bahar, supra note 34.
263. See generally Bahar, supra note 34, at 7.
264. See Bahar, supra note 34, at 6-7.
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then initiate a second land-based step.2 65 This second step should consist of
support by the international community for the formation of a viable
governmental structure within Somalia.2 66  There is significant evidence to
support the contention that Somalia's lack of any cohesive central authority is
directly related to the rise in piracy.267  An eye opening admission by an
anonymous Somali pirate highlights the interconnectivity of violence, piracy and
a lack of government, "I am Somali; the gun is our government." 268 Prior to the
1991 collapse of Somalia's government there were few if any documented
instances of piracy.269 Since that time piracy has become more organized and
the frequency of attacks has increased. 27 However, during the six-month rule of
the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006 piracy in the area they controlled
completely stopped.27 1 After the UIC took control of Somalia they issued a
statement declaring that incidents of piracy would be punished under the strict
• • 272 ..
Islamic Sharia law. The most rational conclusion supported by this evidence
is that when a government is providing for the needs of its citizens and punishing
criminal acts, the incentive for engaging in piracy is greatly diminished.
2 73
Furthermore, a fully functional government would provide the necessary
foundation to deal with the core problem of piracy as opposed to treating its
symptoms. 274 This central issue of piracy would be solved in part by allowing
peacekeeping naval forces to more easily meet the communication requirements
of Resolution 1816. 275  A functional government could also provide and
maintain an entity responsible for the regulation of commercial fishing in
Somalia's territorial waters, thereby eliminating the local warlords' income
sources and justifications for engaging in piracy. /o
265. Bedford, supra note 35.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Bahar, supra note 34, at 7.
269. Bedford, supra note 35.
270. Id.
271. Bedford, supra note 35. (noting the cessation of piracy during the UIC's rule and inferring
that the harshness of Islamic Sharia law greatly reduced the incentive to engage in violent acts of
piracy).
272. Audrey Gillan, Guns, grenades and GPS: the brutal reality of Somalia's hi-tech pirates,
THE GUARDIAN, June 12, 2007
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/12/audreygillan.international.
273. See generally Bedford, supra note 35.
274. See generally Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 40.
275. See id.
276. LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 13.
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The practical implementation of the second prong of this strategy is
complicated by Somalia's fractured political state. 277  Several major regions
within the country, including Puntland, which is a hotbed of piracy, have
operated independent from the capital city of Mogadishu since the 1991 fall of
Barre's regime. 278 A course of diplomacy recognizing and supporting multiple
governmental structures within the current borders of Somalia, each having
authority over these disparate regions, would be more effective than the
international community's past attempts to foster a nationwide democratic
state. 279  This land-based strategy also requires the continued attention of an
international community distracted by conflicts throughout Africa and the
Middle East. 28  Somali pirates inadvertently advanced their notoriety by
hijacking a cargo of anti-aircraft weapons and Russian made tanks allegedly
destined for war ravaged Sudan.28 1 In doing so, they also demonstrated that
piracy has become inextricably bound with other ongoing conflicts in Africa.
282
If the hijacked weapons were being transferred to southern Sudan, this would
constitute a breach of an internationally negotiated peace agreement which ended
283the brutal twenty-one year civil war in Sudan. This staggering recent
development in the Somali piracy problem will unquestionably support the
focused determination necessary to implement this strategy.
284
This two-fold strategy of modifying Resolution 1816 and fostering some
form of a capable Somali government will play an important role in the
.... 285
continued eradication of terrorism throughout the world. This assertion is best
demonstrated in the form of a syllogism: if the international community ensures
277. See LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36, at 11 (noting that attempting to form a cohesive
government would be problematic in and of itself, but this is exacerbated by the fact that many of
the autonomous regions within Somalia each consider themselves independent sovereigns, and
would much prefer to be recognized as such than to be grouped again in the entire unit that is
Somalia).
278. Bedford, supra note 35.
279. Id.
280. Id. (observing that conflicts range from genocide in Rwanda to outright civil war in The
Democratic Republic of the Congo).
281. Wadhams, supra note 99.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. Jeffery Gentleman, Somali Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice, THE N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/africa/27pirates.html (noting
that Somali pirates inadvertently hijacked a cargo of 33 Russian made T-72 tanks and ammunition
bound for the brutal warzone of Sudan. Although the international community responded and
prevented any off-loading of the dangerous cargo, this incident highlights the very real threat
piracy poses).
285. See generally Masciarelli, supra note 101; Wadhams, supra note 99; BANLAOI, supra note
100 at 121-22.
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the safety of Somalia's seas, those same seas will be unavailable for acts of
terror designed to restrict the flow of oil and trade through the Suez Canal.2 86 At
which point, those seas will also be unavailable for acts of piracy which result in
the redirection of weapons to the hands of terrorists. 28 7  If these options are
removed from the battery of strategies employed by terrorists, then the two part
plan executed in an effort to combat Somalia's pirates has effectively reduced
the threat of terror to the international community in general.
288
A reduced threat of terrorist attacks is an important but tertiary goal to the
approach described above.289 A comprehensive land based political, and sea
based tactical strategy would effectively remove the threat of piracy from this
region of the world. 29  At that point the Somali people would have their needs
provided for by a government of the people and the vital trade routes into the
Gulf of Aden would be secure from pirate attacks born of organized crime and
desperation.
29 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
The drastic rise in piracy within the last two decades has provoked
escalating responses from the United Nations. 29 2  Until Resolution 1816,
progress was slow to be realized and made little overall difference in reducing
piracy worldwide.29 3 The Somali pirates, while sometimes motivated by hunger,
286. LEHR &LEHMANN, supra note 36 at 11, 16 (noting Somalia's lack of naval or police forces
and proximity to the trade lanes off of the Horn of Africa and making the inference that additional
forces will thereby secure those vital trade lanes).
287. See generally Masciarelli, supra note 99; Wadhams, supra note 99; BANLAOI, supra note
100 at 121-22.
288. See generally Masciarelli, supra note 99; Wadhams, supra note 99; BANLAOi, supra note
100 at 121-22 (drawing the conclusion that if the international community stifles the funding and
supply of terrorist within Somalia, they have effectively reduced the probability of a terrorist attack
being generated from individuals within that nation).
289. See generally Bedford, supra note 35 (noting that a reduction in threats of terrorism is not
included as a potential benefit of the two pronged plan).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1; Rome Convention, supra note 18; Resolution 1816,
supra note 14 (noting that the escalation may be seen from the all encompassing document that is
UNCLOS, to the more pointed and specific attempt to deal with violence on the high seas that is
the Rome Convention and ending with the specific thrust to remove the threat of piracy from one
of the world's most utilized trade lanes in the form of Resolution 1816).
293. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 1; Rome Convention, supra note 18; Resolution 1816,
supra note 14 (noting the long time frame between submission and adoption of documents, and the
deficiencies previously discussed in this comment regarding UNCLOS and the Rome Convention);
See IMO Briefing 48, supra note 19.
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should not be romanticized. 294  They have stolen, murdered, destroyed,
plundered and escaped silently into the night hundreds of times in recent
history.295 The aggregate affect of those actions will never be known, as many
go unreported. 29 6 It is imperative to realize that because of piracy's effect on
individual human lives, trade, and transport, it is not onl' Somalia that has a
piracy problem, but many nations of the world as well. 2Z The repression of
international trade has been one unintended consequence of the Somali pirates'
actions.29 8  International trade, transport and commerce are essential to the
survival of the world's nations. 299 Any actions taken to endanger, hold back or
repress international trade should be dealt with swiftly and thoroughly by the
international community.30 0  The United Nations embodies proactive
cooperation among its Member States and can therefore be held to represent the
very spirit of international collective action. 30 1 Therefore, it falls squarely upon
the shoulders of the United Nations to respond with extreme prejudice against
those that would harm international trade or the safety of those who facilitate its
logistics.
30 2
Resolution 1816 opens the door far wider than ever before to allow those
nations with the requisite naval resources to protect and vindicate the rights of
their merchants. 303  This resolution has allowed those nations with assets
pledged to the purpose of fighting piracy to more effectively accomplish their
mission.304 Yet pundits and experts state that those countries with the ability to
294. See Bahar, supra note 34, at 41.
295. See Somali pirates kill ship crew member: maritime source, REUTERS, June 4, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0413318520070604 (noting that loss of life has
occurred in similar situations in the past).
296. BURNETr, supra note 20, at 10-1 1.
297. See generally Roger, supra note 8; Costello, supra note 30.
298. Costello, supra note 30; Khan, supra note 116.
299. Michael J. Chrusch, The 299.Michael J. Chrusch, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Reasons For Passage And Requirements To Be A Foreign Legal Consultant In A
NAFTA Country, 3 ILSA J. INT'L& COMP. L. 177, 177 (1996)
300. U.N. Charter Preamble (noting that the U.N. was formed, in part, to preserve and "promote
social progress and better standards of life." These goals can arguably be accomplished by
allowing all nations to prosper, which is only possible through continued and sustained
international trade).
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. Resolution 1816, supra note 14 at 7 (noting that those with naval resources may now
enter Somalia's sovereign territorial waters to protect their nation's commerce and citizens who
have or might fall victim to piracy).
304. See generally Resolution 1816, supra note 14 (noting the latitude afforded Member States
to enter Somali waters to pursue suspected pirates).
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engage the pirates have largely failed to do so. 30 5 Resolution 1816 does not
respond with the necessary strength as it fails to match the daunting task of
eradicating piracy with a directly proportional application of both force and
law. 306 If the United Nations wanted to go beyond a mere reduction in piracy
and unequivocally eliminate it, the international body politic should have
appropriated far more than a request for others to act. 307  Changes to the
substance and form of the resolution should be made and an aggressive
application of political pressure to form a stable governmental authority needs to
be applied by the international community in order to completely stem the tide of
Somalia's piracy.
305. Corey Flintoff, Piracy Flourishes Along Crucial Shipping Lane, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Oct. 3,
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=93893918.
306. See generally ICC Commercial Crime Services, supra note 19; See also IMO Briefing 48,
supra note 19 (noting the description of drastic recent increases in Somalia's piracy problem, and
the persistent pleas for help from the IMO that, until Resolution 1816, went largely unanswered);
Tuerk, supra note 19 (noting that since 2001, increasing numbers of nations have ratified the Rome
Convention which arguably demonstrates an increase in international desire to eradicate threats to
trade and stability in the forms piracy and terrorism.); Resolution 1816, supra note 14 at 7
(noting that Resolution 1816 allows countries to commit their own forces to combat an
international problem, but fails to allocate any United Nations peacekeeping forces in either a
naval, or a land based capacity to prevent piracy off of Somalia's coast).
307. See generally Resolution 1816, supra note 14 at 7 (noting that Resolution 1816 allows
countries to commit their own forces to combat an international problem, but fails to allocate any
United Nations peacekeeping forces in either a naval, or a land based capacity to prevent piracy off
of Somalia's coast.).
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